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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE -
MINOR'S REQUEST TO SEE PARENTS HELD TO BE AN INVOCATION OF
HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
People v. Burton (Calif. 1971)
In a jury trial' the appellant, Bozzie Burton, was found guilty of
murder and assault. The jury was allowed to consider the sixteen-year-
old minor's confession, which had been made subsequent to a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his rights. The trial judge refused to exclude the
confession, though it had been obtained after a denial of the minor's re-
quest to see his parents. 2 The judge ruled that the People had met their
burden of showing that the confession was voluntary, and that it was
not coerced or illegally obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.3
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding: (1)
that when a minor was subjected to custodial interrogation without the
presence of an attorney, his request to see one of his parents, made any-
time before or during questioning, must, in the absence of compelling con-
trary evidence, be construed as an invocation of his fifth amendment
privilege; and (2) that where such an invocation was made, a confession
obtained by subsequent questioning without granting his request was in-
admissible. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1971).
The privilege against self-incrimination was deemed to be such a
significant element in the Framer's notions of liberty that the privilege was
specifically protected from infringement by the Constitution. Despite the
importance attached to this privilege,4 it was not originally one of the
1. Since the appellant was a minor, he was subject to the original jurisdiction
of the juvenile court (see CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 603-07 (West 1972)), which
has no provision for a right to a jury trial. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971). However, the juvenile court apparently waived jurisdiction (see CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 707 (West 1972)), and the minor was transferred to the
adult court, where he received a jury trial. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d
793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
2. It should be noted that, at the trial, counsel for the appellant never specifically
asserted that defendant's request to see his parents invoked his fifth amendment privi-
lege under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, counsel did urge that
Miranda was ignored as a result of the repeated denials of the minor's request to see
his parents. 6 Cal. 3d at 379 & n.1, 491 P.2d at 795 & n.1, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 3 & n.l.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. In writing the majority opinion of the Court in Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422 (1956), Justice Frankfurter stated that the privilege from self-incrimi-
nation under the fifth amendment "registers an important advance in the development
of our liberty - 'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized.'" Id. at 426. Accord, Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 160 (1961)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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safeguards protected from abridgment by the states.5 By 1964, however,
the Supreme Court so interpreted the fourteenth amendment as to curtail
state transgressions against this privilege.6
While the privilege against self-incrimination was applied in many
proceedings, 7 it was not generally accepted as a barrier to coercive police
interrogation until Miranda v. Arizona." In that case the Supreme Court
marked the high water point of the gradual shift in emphasis of legal think-
ing from the coercion concept, based largely on the due process clause,9
5. The United States Supreme Court ruled in 1947 and again in 1961 that the
fourteenth amendment did not include the privileges of the fifth amendment so as to
protect the people from transgressions of the privilege against self-incrimination by
the states. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. After the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment in 1868, there was much controversy as to its effect on state invasion of the
rights enumerated in the first eight amendments. Although earlier cases denied the
application of these safeguards to the states, the United States Supreme Court has
reconsidered many of these earlier decisions. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (protecting from state abridgment the sixth amendment right to counsel
in all criminal cases) ; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (protecting from
state abridgment the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment) ; Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (protecting from state abridgment the fourth amend-
ment right against unreasonable searches and seizures).
Similarly, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Supreme Court recon-
sidered Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947), and extended the fourteenth amendment's umbrella protection to include
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. By so holding, the Supreme
Court overruled Adamson and partially accepted Justice Brennan's dissent in Cohen
(although the Cohen dissent had called for the entire absorption of the fifth amend-
ment by the fourteenth amendment, Malloy incorporated only the self-incirimination
clause of the fifth amendment). The Malloy decision was expressly affirmed in the
following year. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
7. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958) (denaturalization pro-
ceeding in district court) ; Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (witness
before a legislative committee) ; ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894) (commissioner's
hearing) ; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (grand jury investigation) ;
Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 270-72 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (preliminary hearing
before committing magistrate) ; Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938)
(examination by immigration officers) ; State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, 153 P.2d 141
(1944) (coroner's inquest) ; Phleps v. Phleps, 133 N.J.Eq. 392, 32 A.2d 81 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1943) (deposition); Siegel v. Crawford, 266 App. Div. 878, 42 N.Y.S.2d 837
(1943) (pretrial examination of defendant). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE
§ 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion had been raised previously as the controlling test for the admissibility of con-
fessions in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). However, in that case, the
Court used the privilege as the basis for the voluntary test; that is, the confession was
admissible if not coerced. Id. at 542-43. Wigmore claimed that such a test was un-
founded (3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 823, at 250 n.5 (3d ed. 1940)) and, despite
certain subsequent Supreme Court cases citing the test as dicta (see, e.g., 384 U.S. at
506 n.2), the self-incrimination clause was not used to bar confessions again until
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda. In Miranda, it was not used
to support the voluntary test - a test which subsequent to Brain developed on the
basis of the due process clause (see note 9 infra) - but rather to support an inde-
pendent test going to the capacity of the accused to understand and relinquish his
rights. See People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 395, 432 P.2d 202, 223, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586,
607 (1967) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968).
9. The use of the due process clause to test the admissibility of confessions began
in 1936 with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), and its "voluntariness test."
Under this test the confession was admissible if it was not elicited by overbearing
the will of the accused during interrogation, that is, without coercion. See, e.g.,
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). For over 25 years the Court never
1086 [VOL. 17
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to that of the capacity of the accused to understand and relinquish his
constitutional rights, based on the self-incrimination privilege. 10
Recently, the California Supreme Court has recognized that the sus-
pect may invoke his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
by the slightest indication, either through words or action, that he is un-
willing to discuss his case with the police." Prior to the instant case,
however, the California Supreme Court had not determined whether a
minor's request to see his parents was an invocation of this privilege.
At the outset, the Burton court made it clear that the defendant was
not claiming that his confession was involuntary. Rather, the claim was
that it was illegally obtained in violation of his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.' 2 Consequently, the issue was a narrow one
pertaining to the protective devices developed in Miranda,3 and not the
voluntary test established before Miranda.14
According to Miranda, once the warnings have been administered,
the accused exercises his fifth amendment privilege at the point when he
indicates that he wishes to remain silent, requiring that the interrogation
immediately cease.15 The California Supreme Court had probed the ra-
narrowed the voluntary test to a single meaning but infused it with several different
values. Consequently, a "totality of circumstances" test developed, making the determi-
nation of the voluntariness of a confession a question of fact to be decided upon an
examination of all the surrounding circumstances and factors. Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) ; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961) ; see
Note, The Confessions of Juveniles, 5 WILLAMETTE L.J. 66, 76 (1968). See also
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507-09 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10. This concept was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938), later emphasized in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962),
and more clearly expressed in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and in
Mrianda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In the latter two cases the confessions
would have been admissible under the coercion standard but, nevertheless, were found
inadmissible because the defendants had demanded counsel. Interrogation must cease
after such a demand is made. See People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62
Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
The "voluntariness test" is still applicable, along with the additional test con-
cerning the capacity of the accused to understand and relinquish his constitutional
rights. 384 U.S. at 478; see Note, supra note 9, at 77. Similarly, this test is applied
when examining confessions introduced for impeachment purposes. Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
11. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1970)(suspect's telephone call to his attorney) ; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d
580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969) (suspect's statement: "Call my parents for my attor-
ney") ; People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968)(refusal by a suspect to sign a waiver of his constitutional rights).
12. 6 Cal. 3d at 381, 491 P.2d at 796, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Mr. Chief Justice Warren an-
nounced the need for these protective devices, stating:
The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our
Nation's most cherished principles - that the individual may not be compelled toincriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.
Id. at 457-58.
14. See note 9 supra.
15. In the words of the Miranda Court:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If theindividual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he
JUNE 1972] 1087
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tionale of the protections of Miranda in two cases prior to Burton -
People v. Ireland'6 and People v. Randall.17 In the Ireland case, the
court concluded that one of the primary protective devices envisioned by
Miranda was that any indication by the suspect that he wished to invoke
his privilege would require the termination of all custodial interrogation.' 8
Furthermore, the Randall court held that "no particular form of words or
conduct"' 9 was necessary to indicate this wish. In so holding, the court
expressed its particular concern that, if the suspect had to invoke his
privilege with unmistakable clarity, the prophylactic intent of Miranda
would be lost. Only those with criminal experience, who had learned to
deal with the police, would benefit from such an interpretation, while it
would operate most severely on the ignorant and inexperienced suspects -
those most susceptible to the custodial interrogation. 20 By avoiding any
inclination to establish set ways to invoke the fifth amendment, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court fulfilled what it thought to be the principal objective
of Miranda - to establish safeguards that would eliminate the need to
determine whether the confession was obtained through coercion.21
Following the thrust of these cases, the Burton court had little diffi-
culty in holding that a minor's request for his parents constituted an in-
vocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. The court drew an
analogy between the natural inclination of an adult, no longer under pa-
rental guidance, to request an attorney and the natural inclination of a
minor to turn to his parents for help.22 In the Ireland and Randall cases,
has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege .... If
the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present.
384 U.S. at 473-74.
16. 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969). The Ireland case
involved an adult man who killed his wife and was subsequently found guilty of second
degree murder. The California Supreme Court reversed on the ground that hearsay
evidence was erroneously admitted at the trial level. The court went on to determine
that certain extrajudicial statements were obtained in violation of the defendant's con-
stitutional rights, and therefore they should not be admitted upon retrial. See note 39
infra. This holding was based on the fact that, after being advised of his rights, the
defendant replied, "Call my parents for my attorney."
17. 1 Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1970). In reversing an adult
defendant's conviction for grand theft, the Randall court found that the suspect's call
to an attorney in and of itself constituted an invocation of his fifth amendment privilege.
18. 70 Cal. 3d at 535, 450 P.2d at 587, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
19. 1 Cal. 3d at 955, 464 P.2d at 118, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
20. Id.
21. In People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968),
the court emphasized that:
A principal objective of that decision [Miranda] was to establish safeguards that
would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome neces-
sity of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or
physical, had been employed to secure admissions or confessions.
Id. at 717, 441 P.2d at 626, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
In Fioritto, a 19-year-old defendant refused to sign a waiver of his rights. He was
then confronted with his codefendants, which confrontation precipitated his waiver
after he had been once again informed of his rights. The court found that once he
refused to sign the waiver he had invoked his fifth amendment privilege and the sub-
sequent confession was inadmissible. 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817.
22. 6 Cal. 3d at 382, 491 P.2d at 797, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 5. Drawing this analogy was
significant, since the court held, in effect, that special considerations are necessary to
1088 [VOL. 17
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both of which involved adults, it was sufficient for the adult to ask for
his attorney 23 or to call his attorney on the telephone 24 to invoke his
privilege against self-incrimination. Following this analogy, the Burton
court held that a minor could similarly invoke the fifth amendment privilege
when he requested to see his parents.25
The People advanced two counterarguments. First, they contended
that Bozzie Burton's request to see his parents did not clearly give the
police notice that he was asserting his fifth amendment privilege.26 They
argued that the request could have been made for several reasons other than
the intent to invoke his privilege.
This argument was similar to one advanced in Randall, where the
adult defendant made a telephone call to his attorney and the People
claimed that the call could have been made for a variety of purposes. In
particular, the state claimed that a mere telephone call to an attorney was
not as clear an invocation of the fifth amendment privilege as occurred in
Ireland, where the defendant requested that his parents be called for his
attorney.27 The Randall court rejected this contention and required the
People to show that such a phone call did not constitute an invocation of
the fifth amendment privilege.28 Based on this precedent, the Burton court
concluded that the People had not met their burden of proof in the instant
case, since they had failed to show that the defendant's request for a parent
was not an invocation of his privilege.29
Secondly, the People argued that, since Burton's request occurred
before the interrogation and before the Miranda warnings were given, it
was unlikely the police understood it as an invocation of the privilege. The
majority read this as a further elaboration of the People's first argument
concerning lack of notice and, therefore, discounted it due to the lack of
affirmative proof that the defendant did not intend to assert his privilege.30
The majority's holding appears to follow the literal language of
Miranda, which indicated that the privilege is asserted "if the individual
indicates . . . at any time prior to . . . questioning that he wishes to
remain silent .... "31 This discussion in Miranda, however, was concerned
determine whether a minor has invoked his fifth amendment privilege. See text ac-
companying notes 46-62 infra.
23. People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969). See
note 16 supra.
24. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1970). See
note 18 supra.
25. In the terms of the Randall court, Burton held that "a minor's request to see
his parents 'reasonably appears inconsistent with a present willingness on the part
of the suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with police at that time,'" and
must be held as an invocation of his fifth amendment privilege. 6 Cal. 3d at 382, 491
P.2d at 797, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
26. Id. at 382, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
27. Id. at 382-83, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6 (emphasis added).
28. 1 Cal. 3d at 957, 464 P.2d at 120, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
29. 6 Cal. 3d at 383, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
30. Id.
31. 384 U.S. at 473-74. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
JUNE. 1972] 1089
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with the effect of an invocation after warnings had been given.8 2 The facts
of Burton suggest, though the court did not discuss it, the issue of whether
an invocation of the fifth amendment privilege can be nullified by subse-
quent Miranda warnings and waiver. In People v. Fioritto,33 the majority
stated that, in its view, a principal objective of Miranda was to establish
safeguards which would eliminate the need to determine whether psycho-
logical or physical coercion was used to obtain the confession. 34 Hence,
once the privilege was asserted, it was presumed that any further inter-
rogation was coercive and the confession obtained involuntary. These
presumptions would be operable even if the confession was obtained after
the Miranda warnings and subsequent to a waiver. The instant case fol-
lowed this view.85 By asking for his parents, the appellant invoked his
fifth amendment privilege, and consequently, when the police thereafter
proceeded to give Burton his warnings and elicit a waiver and a confes-
sion, they violated the appellant's fifth amendment privilege. Thus, Burton
did not have to assert that his confession was involuntary; he only had to
assert an invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination.
This view was juxtaposed against Justice Burke's dissenting opinion in
Fioritto that the objective of Miranda was the prevention of in-custody
interrogation of suspects "without first advising them of their constitu-
tional rights, affording them an opportunity to exercise them, or securing
from them a waiver of such rights." 36 Consistent with this theory, Justice
Burke claimed that the police may approach the suspect after the invocation
of the fifth amendment privilege.3 7 Therefore, according to Justice Burke,
32. Taken in context, the Miranda Court said:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.
384 U.S. at 473. Both sentences together imply that first the warnings must be given
and then any subsequent invocation of the privilege would require the termination of
the interrogation.
33. 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968). See note 21 supra.
34. Id. at 717, 441 P.2d at 626, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
35. 6 Cal. 3d at 381-82, 491 P.2d at 796-97, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
36. 68 Cal. 2d at 720, 441 P.2d at 628, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 820. (Burke, J., dis-
senting).
37. Id. at 726-28, 441 P.2d at 631-33, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 823-25. Justice Burke
argued that the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination did not preclude
the possibility of a subsequent confession as long as it was preceded by a waiver. While
he listed three cases in support of his contention, they were all pre-Miranda. In the
first of the three cases, Cox v. United States, 373 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1967), the de-
fendant refused to speak to certain postal inspectors concerning the burglary of a post
office. However, when they revealed that his codefendant had given them the story,
he made an incriminating statement which was admitted into evidence. Cox can be
compared with Fioritto which involved similar facts but was decided after Miranda.
In Fioritto, however, the California Supreme Court found the confession inadmissible
based upon the Miranda holding - that interrogation must cease after any invocation of
the fifth amendment privilege. See note 21 supra. Similarly, it is likely that the Eighth
Circuit would have found the confession in the Cox case inadmissible if it had been
decided after Miranda.
In the second of the three cases, People v. Hill, 66 Cal. 2d 536, 426 P.2d 908, 58
Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967), one of the defendants requested the assistance of an attorney
after being advised of his rights. Later he indicated that he wished to make a state-
1090 [VOL. 17
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the giving of the Miranda warnings after such an invocation, followed by
a waiver and a confession, would not amount to coercion per se ;ss rather,
he indicated that such a confession could be voluntary.
The Fioritto court's interpretation of the objective of Miranda was
accepted in Burton. However, the California Supreme Court has also
adopted Justice Burke's view that a voluntary confession was admissible,
even if made after an invocation of the fifth amendment privilege; yet,
his precise definition of voluntary confessions has not received acceptance.39
In fact, the court has held that a confession could not be voluntary within
the meaning of Miranda where the questioning was renewed 40 or con-
ment, after again being advised of his rights, he made a statement. The Hill court
stated :
[T]here is no reason why once having requested counsel and the request having
been recognized by a cessation of interrogation, the accused cannot elect to pro-
ceed without counsel if that election is freely, knowingly and intelligently made.
Id. at 553, 426 P.2d at 919, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
From the record it appears that this confession may have been initiated by the
defendant himself, rather than by subsequent interrogation, making it a voluntary
confession admissible even under the Miranda standard. See note 39 and accompanying
text infra.
In the last of these cases, People v. Hunter, 252 Cal. App. 2d 472, 60 Cal. Rptr.
563 (Ct. App. 1967), the fifth amendment privilege was never invoked by any of the
defendants. Therefore, it was immaterial that the confession of a codefendant was
to obtain admissions from the other codefendants, as the other codefendants did not
indicate that they wished to assert their privilege.
38. 68 Cal. 2d at 726, 441 P.2d at 632, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (dissenting opinion).
Disputing the majority's contention that the defendant must initiate a voluntary state-
ment and, in particular, that the giving of the Miranda warnings and asking the de-
fendant to waive his rights constituted coercion, Justice Burke said:
Such a request is not interrogation for the purpose of eliciting incriminating state-
ments, but is specifically an inquiry for permission, which may be denied, to con-
duct such interrogation. Hence, the problem reduces itself into whether such
an inquiry (whether defendant desires to waive his rights) is coercive per se.
To hold that it is would definitely conflict with former decisions of this and other
courts, and in my opinion with Miranda.
Id. It is interesting to note that Justice Burke joined with the majority in Burton,
perhaps, because he accepted the precedent of Fioritto or because he considered the
situation of minors to be special.
39. Miranda specifically stated that "[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not
barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding
today." 384 U.S. at 478.
The California Supreme Court recognized the admissibility of voluntary con-
fessions in People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967).
The California court's interpretation of the Miranda term "voluntary," however, was
that the confession be initiated by the accused. Hence it was important in Lara that
the trial judge found that the defendant "made a very sophisticated approach by trying
to make a deal with the officers. Both he and the officers agree that he instituted this,
not the officers." Id. at 392, 432 P.2d at 224, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (emphasis added).
Consequently, Lara's confession was admissible even though he had invoked his fifth
amendment privilege at an earlier time.
40. People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969).
In that case the defendant invoked his fifth amendment privilege while riding in the
police car to the police station. Even though another officer, who did not know about
the defendant's request for his lawyer, later informed him of his rights, and the de-
fendant indicated that he wanted to talk, the court held that the confession was inad-
missible. In so holding, the court quoted Fioritto, stating:
The form of the renewed queries, however subtle or gentle, cannot be considered
in determining whether there has been a violation of the stern principles prescribed
by the Supreme Court in Miranda. (68 Cal. 2d at p. 720, [441 P.2d at 628, 68 Cal.
Rptr. at 820].)
Id. at 537, 450 P.2d at 589, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 197 (emphasis added).
1091
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tinued4 1 after an invocation of the fifth amendment privilege. Thus, in
order for a confession made after an invocation of the privilege to be
voluntary and admissible, it must be initiated by the defendant, solely as a
result of his own change of mind.
After finding that Burton's request to see his parents did invoke his
privilege against self-incrimination and that the People had failed to meet
their burden of demonstrating that such a request was not tantamount
to an assertion of his privilege, the court held that Burton's subsequent
confession was inadmissible and therefore constituted reversible error.42
This finding of reversible error followed the opinions of Randall43 and
Fioritto.44 In those cases it was held that "the introduction in evidence of
a confession obtained from a defendant in violation of constitutional guar-
antees is prejudicial, per se. . ."45 and compels a reversal of his conviction. 4
In holding that a minor's request for his parents invokes his fifth
amendment privilege, the Burton court protected Bozzie Burton's consti-
tutional rights by a slight expansion of the existing precedents47 - making
allowance for the behavior tendencies of a minor.48 In light of its interest
in safeguarding the constitutional rights of a minor, clearly, the Burton
court could have gone further than it did. However, the court was not
required to decide the issue of whether a minor could, under any circum-
stances, waive his rights. Nevertheless, it might have set down a stronger
doctrine, insisting that his parents, his guardian, or his counsel be present
during any questioning. A holding of this nature would have found sup-
port from a number of sources, including the California legislature. Recog-
nizing the minor's need for a guiding hand in the legal process, California
lawmakers have provided for the immediate notification of the parent or
guardian of the minor or for appointment of counsel to represent the minor
upon his first appearance in the court system which, in California, is before
41. People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 719, 441 P.2d 625, 627, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817,
819 (1968). In that case the court held:[W]e prohibit only continued questioning after an individual has once asserted
his constitutional rights. We do not, of course, disapprove of the use of state-
ments, whether admissions or confessions, voluntarily initiated by a suspect.
Id. (emphasis added). See note 21 supra.
42. 6 Cal. 3d at 383-84, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
43. 1 Cal. 3d at 958, 464 P.2d at 120-21, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 664-65.
44. 68 Cal. 2d at 720, 441 P.2d at 628, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
45. 1 Cal. 3d at 958, 464 P.2d at 120-21, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 664-65.
46. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964), the Supreme Court announced
the principle that the introduction of an involuntary confession constituted reversible
error and was a deprivation of due process if it had any bearing on the conviction.
The Jackson Court held the doctrine of reversible error applicable even though there
was ample evidence, aside from the confession, to support the conviction.
The Supreme Court of California recognized this doctrine in People v. Powell,
67 Cal. 2d 32, 51-52, 429 P.2d 137, 148, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817, 828 (1967). In Powell, theintroduction of a confession into court, in violation of the constitutional guarantees,
was found prejudicial per se, compelling reversal despite other evidence of guilt.
47. See note 11 supra.
48. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
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a magistrate. 49 This insulation of the minor at the magisterial level would
be a nullity if it were not extended to the interrogation stage.50
Additionally, the judiciary, as well as lawmakers, has recognized the
special needs of a minor. The United States Supreme Court recognized
the minor's need for a guiding hand in In re Gault.51 Also, in two
cases preceding that landmark decision, Haley v. Ohio5 2 and Gallegos v.
Colorado,5' 3 the Court reversed the murder convictions of certain minors,
due to the inadmissibility of their confessions. The Court reasoned that
confessions and admissions of juveniles required special caution,54 because
a juvenile, "no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception
of what will confront him" and is "unable to know how to protect his own
interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights."5" More-
over, in Haley, the Court stated:
[A juvenile] needs counsel and support if he is not to become the
victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean,
lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, crush him.56
Therefore, the Supreme Court has arguably set forth the postulate that it
is unlikely that a minor will be able to withstand police pressures and
assert or understand his rights absent the assistance of an adult.5 7 In
this respect, a juvenile needs a guiding hand during the period of inter-
rogation considerably more than does an adult. The Gault Court indicated
that counsel should be present and aptly stated that:
[I]f counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an
admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that
the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 858 (West 1970).
50. See People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 400, 432 P.2d 202, 226, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586,
610 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
51. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
52. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
53. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
54. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Haley, gave express recognition
to the additional factors involved in determining the admissibility of a minor's con-
fession, stating:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man
were involved. And when, as here, a mere child - an easy victim of the law - is
before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender
and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting
standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed
can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great
instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year-old lad, questioned
through the dead of night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the inquisition.
332 U.S. at 599.
55. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962). It should be noted that, in the
Haley and Gallegos cases, the defendant minors were subjected to prolonged ques-
tioning or held incommunicado for a substantial period of time. Hence, their confes-
sions, even as adults, would probably have been inadmissible. However, the more
significant point of these cases appears to be that the Court was starting to recognize
that special considerations must be given minors in such situations.
56. 332 U.S. at 600.
57. Cf. Note, supra note 9, at 78.
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coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance
of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.
5 8
In this manner Gault indicated that a higher standard of safeguards is
needed when dealing with an adolescent.
In response to this need for a higher standard, many commentators
have indicated that a juvenile is not capable of waiving his constitutional
rights and have suggested potential avenues along which the Burton court
might have proceeded. 59 While it is arguable that these commentators
dealt only with the waiver question and not with the invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination, in all practicality, the two issues are
merely opposite sides of the same coin. Once the minor is confronted by
the authorities, he can either invoke his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion or he can waive his rights. If he is incompetent to make an effective
waiver, certainly he is incompetent to know that he should assert his fifth
amendment privilege. In this regard, it is of some significance that at
least one judge on the California Supreme Court has advanced the proposi-
tion that no minor may waive his constitutional rights unless he has had
the advice and counsel of a friendly adult.0° Similarly, a rule requiring
the presence of a parent, guardian or attorney for the child in order to
make admissible any confessions made by him, has been advanced in the
National Crime Commission Report"' and by the Council of Judges of the
58. 387 U.S. at 55 (footnotes omitted). It should be pointed out that both Haley
and Gallegos were criminal cases, while Gault was a juvenile court case. However, all
dealt with the special considerations needed when considering the admission of a
minor's extrajudicial statements.
59. Some courts have held that a minor, seventeen years old, is incapable of
waiving his constitutional and statutory rights in a criminal action, unless it appears
beyond all doubt that the minor defendant fully understands the effects and the results
growing out of such a waiver. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 381 P.2d 167 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1962) ; Olivera v. State, 354 P.2d 792 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960).
A lower standard was not sufficient for Judge Edgerton, who, in writing the
majority opinion in Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1944), stated that,
in his personal opinion, as a matter of law, a boy of seventeen could not competently
waive his right to counsel in a criminal case. While this view was not literally ac-
cepted, the standards and inference against an effective waiver noted in the court's
second opinion (146 F.2d 867 (1945)), have been generally accepted. See, e.g., Moore
v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) ; People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d
358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965).
A leading authority in the field has also rejected the idea that a fourteen-year-old
could waive his rights without the advice of counsel. See Paulsen, Fairness to the
Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 562 (1957).
Perhaps the most interesting rejection of the idea that a minor should be allowed
to waive his rights is Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Prob-
lems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 33-34. This commentator placed
the community interest, in not allowing a waiver, above that of the adolescent or the
parents as they conceive the merits of the situation. Basically, the community interest
is in protecting the minor's rights which, Professor Handler indicates, can be ac-
complished only by making these rights mandatory.
60. See People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 396-97, 432 P.2d 202, 223, 62 Cal. Rptr.
586, 607 (1967) (Peters, J., dissenting).
61. The National Crime Commission Report recommended that:
Counsel should be appointed as a matter of course wherever coercive action is a
possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86-87 (1967).
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National Council of Crimes and Delinquency.6 2 One judge has gone even
further and has indicated that he would refuse to admit, as evidence, any
statement obtained from a juvenile while in custody.63
Furthermore, it is instructive to note that the need for the presence
of a parent during custodial interrogation is not merely abstract conjecture
but has been held to be critical in some instances. 64 Such results stem
from the requirement that a minor's waiver must be tested in light of the
"totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession." 65 The Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that the parents' absence during a police inter-
rogation was a possible reason, in itself, to hold a confession inadmissible,
even though the minor did not wish to see his parents. 6 The court rea-
soned that:
[B]oys of 13 and 15 lack the judgment to appreciate the seriousness
of the situation and the harm which they may do themselves by yield-
ing to the pressures of insistent police questioning. 67
Moreover, the New Jersey court stated that eminent authorities on juve-
niles were in accord that parents should be present during any interrogation
of minors which concerned acts of delinquency.6 8
It seems unlikely that the legal process would be overburdened by
requiring the presence of a minor's parent, guardian, or counsel during
any custodial interrogation. Although such a requirement might make it
more difficult to obtain confessions from minors, it is posited that confes-
sions obtained from custodial interrogations without the presence of the
minor's parent or counsel are, more often than not, untrustworthy. It has
been stated:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a
system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the
"confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to
abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independ-
ently secured through skillful investigation. 9
62. COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL
RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS Rule 25 (proposed final draft 1968).
63. Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reap-
praisals, 53 VA. L. REV. 1700, 1714 n.40 (1967).
64. See Note, supra note 9, at 80.
65. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962), in which the "totality of circum-
stances" test involved a consideration of the petitioner's age, length of detention, failure
to send for his parents, failure to immediately bring him before the juvenile courtjudge, and failure to insure that he had the advice of a lawyer or a friend. See Glen,
Interrogation of Children: When Are Their Admissions Admissible? 2 FAMILY L.Q.
280, 281 (1968).
66. In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966).
67. Id. at 241, 225 A.2d at 119.
68. Id. at 240, 225 A.2d at 119.
69. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
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Moreover, special criminal law safeguards for the minor appear more
appropriate in considering that the minor has enjoyed a privileged status
in the civil law for many years.7 0
While the instant case was decided in the criminal court, its impact
should extend into the juvenile courts as well. Since In re Gault,7 1 it has
been recognized that most of the constitutional safeguards in criminal
court are available to the minor in juvenile court. 72 Although the Court
limited its holding in Gault to the adjudicatory stage, its safeguards
appear applicable to pre-trial interrogation. 73 Otherwise, the privilege
against self-incrimination and other constitutional rights, accorded minors
at the juvenile hearing stage, would be virtually meaningless. Future
Bozzie Burtons, whether tried in the criminal court or the juvenile court,
should be able to assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
Even though the impact of Burton is broadened by the possible
application of its principles to the juvenile court, its practical effect has
necessarily been lessened by the recent Supreme Court decision in Harris
v. New York, 74 which allowed less than total exclusion of objectionable
confessions. The emphasis in Burton was that the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination imposed a stricter test as to the admissi-
bility of confessions than the due process test under the fourteenth
amendment (the voluntariness test). 75  The Supreme Court, however,
diminished the impact of this fifth amendment application by allowing
impeachment of the defendant who takes the stand by use of a confession
garnered under the fourteenth amendment standard alone.76 Thus, it
appears that the exclusionary remedy in Burton is not as effective as the
court might have contemplated, because, under Harris, a minor's confes-
sion given after an ineffective waiver, might be introduced to impeach his
later denial of guilt.
70. For a general discussion of the privilege status of the minor in civil law, see
People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 379 & n.6, 397-98, 432 P.2d 202, 212 & n.6, 224, 62
Cal. Rntr. 586, 596 & n.6, 608 (1967) (citations are to both the majority and dissent-
ing opinions).
71. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
72. The Gault Court held that a minor in juvenile court has the following basic
rights: (1) right to notice of the charges; (2) right to counsel; (3) right to con-
frontation and cross-examination; (4) privilege against self-incrimination; (5) right
to a transcript of the proceedings; and (6) right to appellate review. Id. Since Gault,
the only right that the Supreme Court has denied a juvenile is the right to a jury
trial. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
73. See Note, supra note 9, at 69-70.
74. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The Harris case involved a defendant who was in-
dicted for selling heroin twice to an undercover police officer. When he elected to take
the stand, he was subsequently impeached by his own confession. Although the con-
fession had been obtained without granting him his procedural safeguards under
Miranda, there was no assertion by the defendant that the statements had been coerced
or made involuntarily. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion, simply
indicated that the "privilege [to testify] cannot be construed to include the right to
commit perjury." Id. at 225.
75. See notes 9-12 supra.
76. 401 U.S. at 225.
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Nevertheless, the Burton case remains significant in that the general
admissibility of confessions is still subject to both the fifth and the four-
teenth amendment tests. The fourteenth amendment provides the exclu-
sive test of admissibility only for impeachment purposes when the defendant
takes the stand. More importantly, Harris does not lessen Burton's
significance in the latter's recognition of the need for a greater sensitivity
to the problems of a minor when confronted with the criminal process.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of California has recognized that
a minor may indicate his unwillingness to discuss his case with the police
simply by requesting to see his parents. Such a request is an invocation
of the minor's fifth amendment privilege, and a subsequent confession,
even if preceded by an intelligent and knowing waiver, constitutes rever-
sible error upon its admission as evidence for other than impeachment
purposes. With the growing realization of the need to safeguard a minor's
constitutional rights and with the increasing awareness of the special
considerations necessary to fulfill this task, especially as compared to an
adult, the courts may eventually go further and hold that a child, alone,
does not have adequate knowledge to protect his interests, to invoke his
privilege against self-incrimination, or to make an intelligent waiver.
Robert M. John
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